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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
RICHARD WILLIS JONES,
Defendant/Appellant.

:
:

CaseNo.200700403-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the
Honorable Robin W. Reese presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Is venue a procedural prerequisite that a defendant must place in issue for a
court ruling before trial, or is it a part of the case that the prosecutor must prove to the
jury at trial?
Standard of Review. Statutory law governs venue, and statutory interpretation is
a question of law. See State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1977) ("the legislature
has been given the power to pass laws regarding the waiver of, or the application of, the
privilege of venue"); State v. Gallegos, 2007 UT 81, If 8, 589 Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (the

appellate courts "review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no
deference to the district court's legal conclusions") (citation omitted).
2. In any case, did the trial court abuse its discretion when, following the
defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case, the court allowed the State
to reopen to put on evidence that the Saddler Drive residence, where the crime was
committed, was located in Salt Lake County?
Standard of Review. A trial court abuses its discretion "only if the trial court's
decision [is] beyond the limits of reasonability," or, in other words, only "if the trial
court's actions are inherently unfair or if... no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the trial court." State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^ 101, 63 P.3d 731 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant statues are reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202 (West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with unlawful possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i). R2. A jury found defendant guilty as charged. R95. The trial court imposed
an indeterminate prison term not to exceed five years, but suspended the sentence and
placed defendant on probation. R98.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
"I have drugs in my pocket"
On October 6, 20055 Officer Kenneth Eatchel, a warrants detective, went to 8564
Saddler Drive in West Jordan to arrest defendant on an outstanding warrant. R129:13-15.
Defendant was cooperative. R129:15. Officer Eatchel's normal procedure was to
handcuff an arrestee and then search him for weapons and/or contraband. R129:16.
After Officer Eatchel handcuffed defendant, he asked defendant whether he had
"anything that I need to be concerned with . . . sharp objects—needles, anything that
would poke me or stick me." Id. Defendant responded, "I have drugs in my pocket." Id.
Defendant specified that he had methamphetamine in the right cargo pocket of his pants.
R129:17.
Officer Eatchel removed a plastic pill bottle from that pocket. R129:18. Inside
the bottle was a plastic bag, and inside the bag was a white crystalline powder. Rl 29:46.
Tests conducted at the State Crime laboratory identified the substance as
methamphetamine. R129:48.
"I would be willing because it sounds like an oversight
to permit the State to reopen"
During the State's case in chief, Officer Kenneth Eatchel testified that he was a
West Jordan police officer. R129:12-13. He further testified that he arrested defendant
on an outstanding warrant at 8564 Saddler Drive. R129:14-15. After the State presented
its testimony and rested, defense counsel moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the

3

State had produced no evidence that the crime occurred in Salt Lake County. R129:6768.
The State agreed that the officer had testified to the address on Saddler Drive, but
had not testified that the address was located within Salt Lake County. Rl29:69. The
State therefore asked the trial court to take judicial notice that the address was in Salt
Lake County. R129:69.
The trial court responded, "I don't think I would have any trouble taking judicial
notice that West Jordan City is in Salt Lake Count[y], but I'm not enough personally
familiar with this address to say that I could take judicial notice that it's in West Jordan
City which is in Salt Lake County." Id. The Court stated, however, "I don't remember
whether the officer talked about this being in West Jordan City or not, b u t . . . I would be
willing because it sounds like an oversight to permit the State to reopen to call the officer
for that one purpose . . . and allow him to testify." R129:71.
Defense counsel objected, arguing that "the State has rested" and that the location
in Salt Lake County "was an essential element that they needed to prove and they
haven't." Rl 29:71-72. The trial court, however, concluded that the lack of testimony on
the matter "sounds like an oversight." R129:72. The court stated: "I don't see any real
prejudice, and I'll permit the State to do it if that's what they want to do." Id.
Officer Eatchel then took the stand and testified that he arrested defendant "at
8564 South Saddler Drive in West Jordan, Utah in the County of Salt Lake."
R129:73-74.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State
to reopen its case to present additional testimony of venue. He claims that, absent the
additional testimony, the evidence did not suffice to support his conviction.
Defendant's claim fails first because in Utah venue is a procedural prerequisite. A
defendant must make any objection to venue before trial or objections are waived. If
placed in issue, the trial court must determine proper venue by a preponderance of the
evidence. Venue is not part of the case that the State must prove to the jury.
Here, defendant made no pretrial objection to venue. Thus he waived his right to
object. Further, because venue need not be proved to the jury, permitting the State to
reopen to present additional evidence of venue was harmless.
In any case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to
reopen its case before defendant had presented any evidence. The State's failure to
present evidence that Saddler Drive was in West Jordan City and that West Jordan City
was in Salt Lake County was inadvertent. The trial court's decision to allow the State to
reopen did not prejudice defendant's ability to present his defense.
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ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that "this court should reverse because the trial court abused its
discretion when, following [defendant's] motion for a directed verdict, it allowed the
State to reopen its case in order to put on additional evidence regarding venue."
Appellant's Br. at 6 (capitalization, boldface, and underlining omitted). Defendant
claims that "[t]he trial court based its decision on its finding that the State's failure to
present evidence of venue was an oversight" and argues that "the finding was clearly
erroneous." Id. at 8, 10. He contends that "because the State made a conscious decision
to rely on circumstantial evidence of venue, rather than presenting direct evidence, it was
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow the State to reopen its case to present
direct evidence of venue when its gamble failed." Id. at 10.
Defendant's claim fails for two reasons. First, under Utah law, venue is a
procedural prerequisite to prosecution, not an element of the offense to be proved at trial,
and must be raised by objection before trial begins. Defendant did not object before trial
and therefore waived any objection to venue. Thus, venue was not in issue, and
permitting the State to reopen to present evidence of venue was, at most, harmless.
Second, assuming arguendo that venue was a matter for the jury and that it had been
placed at issue, the trial court acted properly in permitting the State to reopen and present
evidence of venue.

o

I.
IN UTAH, VENUE IS A PROCEDURAL PREREQUISITE THAT A
DEFENDANT MUST PLACE IN ISSUE FOR A COURT RULING
BEFORE TRIAL; IT IS NOT PART OF THE CASE THAT THE
PROSECUTOR MUST PROVE TO THE JURY AT TRIAL
In some jurisdictions, venue must be proved at trial. In those jurisdictions, "venue
is not simply a prerequisite that the defendant may choose to challenge pretrial; it is
viewed as part of the case that the prosecution must prove at trial." See Wayne R.
LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 16.1(g) (2d ed. 1999).
But in other jurisdictions, including Utah, venue is a procedural prerequisite,
"treat[ed] in much the same manner as other procedural prerequisites for prosecution."
Id. at § 16.1(g) & n.230 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202(2) and State v. Cauble, 563
P.2d 775 (Utah 1977)). "In those jurisdictions, the defendant must put the venue
prerequisite in issue by a pretrial motion to dismiss [or by a pretrial objection to venue],
with the court then making a determination that venue does or does not exist." Id. at
§ 16.1(g).
Both statutory and case law establish that Utah treats venue as a procedural
prerequisite. Relevant statutory law is found in the venue statute, Utah Code Ann. § 761-202 (West 2004), and in the statute that defines "presumption of innocence" and
"element of the offense," Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (West 2004).
The venue statute contains two subsections. The first subsection explains how to
"determine[e] the proper place of trial." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202(1). The second
explains how and when allegedly improper venue can be placed in issue. It provides that
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"[a]ll objections of improper place of trial are waived by a defendant unless made before
trial." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202(2).
The statute defining "[pjresumption of innocence" and "[ejlement of the offense"
contains three subsections. The first subsection states that a defendant "is presumed
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1). The second defines "element of the
offense" to include only two matters: (1) "[t]he conduct, attendant circumstances, or
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense,"
and (2) "[t]he culpable mental state required." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(2). The third
specifically provides that "[t]he existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of
the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3). It also states that jurisdiction and venue
"shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence." Id.
Read together, these statutes explain that venue is not an element of the offense. It
is a matter that must be placed in issue before trial, not at trial. And, when placed in
issue, it must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, not by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. While the statutes do not expressly state that the court, not the jury,
shall make the determination of venue, their logic requires that result.
First, to find venue is to find "the proper place of trial." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1202(1). As explained, any objection to venue must be made before trial. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-202(2). Also, as explained, a defendant waives venue if he does not object
before trial. See id. Thus, venue is placed in issue by an objection before trial, at a time
when the trial court can ensure that the trial is held in the proper place. See State v.
8

Miller, 2003 UT App 76U (stating "we believe that the burden to prove venue vests only
if venue is challenged before trial"). It would be illogical to hold trial and then, after
completing the trial, decide whether the trial had or had not been held in the proper place,
particularly where the question must be placed in issue before trial is held.
Second, the standard of proof for establishing venue is "by a preponderance of the
evidence." Courts, not juries, usually make determinations based on this standard. In
fact, to make venue a jury issue would require instructing a jury that it must find the
elements of the offense by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but that it must find venue
only by a preponderance of the evidence.
In addition to the relevant statutory law, Utah case law establishes that venue is a
procedural prerequisite. In Cauble, the defendant appealed his theft conviction, claiming
that venue had been improper and that the state had failed to prove all of the elements of
his offense. 563 P.2d at 776. He also argued that the venue statute was unconstitutional.
Id. at 777.
The Utah Supreme Court rejected Cauble's contentions. The court first held that
the venue statute was constitutional. The court noted that "the right to be tried in the
county in which the crime occurred, is a personal privilege which can be waived by
failing to make a proper objection." Id. Under the venue statute, such objections had to
be made before trial. Id. Cauble's "first objection to the place of trial was not made until
after the prosecution had rested its case." Id. The court therefore concluded that Cauble
could not "be heard to raise the objection on appeal because the statute clearly state[d] it
must be made before trial." Id. In other words, Cauble had waived any claim regarding
9

venue. See id; see also State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1988) (rejecting
Lovell's claim that jury instructions "were improper because they did not specify that at
least one element of each crime charged must have occurred in Davis County," and
holding that because Lovell made no objection to venue before trial, he "waived any
objection thereto").
The court also held that Cauble's claim "that all the elements of the offense were
not proved [wa]s entirely without merit." Cauble, 563 P.2d at 779. The court stated that
the only elements needed to prove theft were "(1) the intent to deprive another of his
property, and (2) the obtaining unauthorized control over the property." Id. The court
then observed, "Furthermore, it should be pointed out that venue is not an element of the
offense and need be proved merely by a preponderance of the evidence." Id.
Thus, case law, like statutory law, establishes that venue must be placed in issue
by an objection before trial and that, when placed in issue, it must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence. While case law does not expressly hold that venue is an
issue for the court, not the jury, the logical considerations outlined above demonstrate
that it is.
This reading of Utah law reflects sound policy. As explained by the California
Supreme Court, the opposite reading, a "rule that venue is a question of fact for the jury
is unsound for a number of fundamental reasons." People v. Posey, 82 P.3d 755, 759
(Cal. 2004). First, making venue a question for the jury "impedes the purposes
underlying the venue provisions, especially their principal purpose . . . from a defendant's
perspective of protecting] a defendant from being required to stand trial in a distant and
10

unduly burdensome locale." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It
"put[s] off any finding of venue until after the defendant [has been] required to undergo
the rigors and hardship of standing trial in an assertedly improper place.'5 Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). It also burdens the prosecution by putting off the
finding of venue until "after the state [has] incurred the time and expense of conducting a
trial there." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, having a jury
decide venue "is inconsistent with contemporary treatment of other analogous . . . issues,
inasmuch as venue is a procedural question involving the appropriateness of a place for a
defendant's trial. .. and not a substantive question relating to the defendant's guilt or
innocence." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Third, such a rule
"threatens the untoward consequence of an unwarranted acquittal when the jury returns a
verdict of not guilty predicated solely on lack of proper venue." Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
For all of these reasons, the California court determined that "venue is a question
of law for the court, to be decided prior to trial," not "a question of fact to be decided by
the jury at the conclusion of trial." Id. at 758, 760.
The policy considerations set forth by that court, together with the language of
Utah statutes and cases addressing venue, demonstrate that here, as in California, venue is
a question of law for the court, not a question of fact for the jury. It is a procedural
prerequisite. Any challenge to the existence of proper venue must be raised by objection
before trial; otherwise, any challenge to venue is waived. If placed in issue, the
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prosecution must present evidence to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
venue is proper, and the court must decide the issue before trial begins.
Defendant's authority is not to the contrary. Defendant relies on State v. Mitchell,
278 P.2d 618 (Utah 1955); State v. Bailey, 282 P.2d 339 (Utah 1955); and Utah Code
Ann. §76-1-501.
Mitchell and Bailey do not decide whether the court or the jury should determine
venue. They merely reject a rule that "where venue is in issue, it must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt," and hold that "it must be done by a preponderance of the evidence
only." Mitchell, 278 P.2d at 620; see also Bailey, 282 P.2d at 340 (quoting Mitchell).1
Section 501 merely states that jurisdiction and venue "shall be established by a
preponderance of the evidence." Defendant asserts that this means that "they
m u s t . . . be proved at trial." Appellant's Br. at 7. It does not. It means that they must be
established by that standard, not that they must be proved to the jury at trial. In State v.
Payne, 892 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court expressly addressed the
statute and held that jurisdiction, the first of the two matters that must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence, is a question for the court, not the jury. See id. at 1033.

No party in either case raised a question about if or when venue must be
established or whether venue can be waived. Mitchell and Bailey argued that venue had
not been established; and in each defendant's case, the court simply held that it had. See
Mitchell, 278 P.2d at 620; Bailey, 282 P.2d at 340.
12

Thus, the court necessarily held that the statute does not require that jurisdiction and
venue be proved at trial.
Moreover, to read this statute to require that venue be proved to the jury at trial is,
as explained above, illogical. It would mean that the proper place for trial could not be
established until after trial was held, potentially requiring the defendant "to stand trial in
a distant and unduly burdensome locale," "putting off any finding of venue until after the
defendant [has been] required to undergo the rigors and hardship of standing trial in an
assertedly improper place," wasting the time and resources of both parties, and resulting
in "the untoward consequence of an unwarranted acquittal when the jury returns a verdict
of not guilty predicated solely on lack of proper venue." Posey, 82 P.3d at 759 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

Defendant has raised no claim that jurisdiction was improper. Questions of
venue are not questions of jurisdiction. Venue "does not involve a question of
fundamental or subject matter jurisdiction over a proceeding." People v. Simon, 25 P.3d
598, 608 (Cal. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If the crime is one over which
California can and does exercise its legislative jurisdiction because it was committed in
whole or in part within the state's borders, California courts have jurisdiction to try the
defendant." Id. If a "charge is brought in a competent court. . ., that court, no matter
where located in the state, may have subject matter jurisdiction of the offense." Id. For
this reason, "venue is not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense; and, both in civil and
criminal cases, a change of venue from the superior court of one county to the same court
in another county does not affect its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case." Id.
"If only the court or courts designated by the relevant venue statute possessed subject
matter jurisdiction over the proceeding, no change of venue from the locality could be
valid, for subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a court. . . ." Id. Thus,
"criminal venue statutes do not involve a court's jurisdiction in the fundamental sense of
subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 609.
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In sum, defendant cannot show that venue was an element of the offense, that it
was ever in issue, or even that—had it been timely placed in issue—it was a question for
the jury. Thus, defendant cannot show that permitting the State to reopen to present
additional evidence of venue affected his case in any way.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO REOPEN ITS CASE TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT VENUE WAS PROPER
Alternatively, assuming for purposes of argument that the State was required to
establish venue at trial, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to allow the State
to reopen its case in chief to present additional evidence that venue in Salt Lake County
was proper.
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the
State to reopen its case to present evidence of venue. More specifically, he claims that
(1) the prosecutor "made a conscious decision" not to "present direct evidence of venue,"
and (2) "absent the additional testimony presented after the trial court improperly allowed
the State to reopen its case, there was insufficient evidence to establish venue by a
preponderance of the evidence." Appellant's Br. at 10-11.
Defendant cannot show that the trial court acted improperly when it permitted the
State to reopen. Utah courts have long recognized that a trial court may permit the State
to reopen its case to meet an insufficiency challenge. See State v. Gregorious, 16 P.2d
893, 894-95 (Utah 1932) (holding that "[i]t was within the discretion of the court to
permit the case to be reopened" where the State asked permission to reopen its case after
14

the State had rested and the defendant had moved for a directed verdict for insufficient
evidence); see also State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954, 957, 962 (Utah App. 1992) (holding that
trial court did not commit plain error when it permitted the State to reopen after the court
had orally dismissed a charge for insufficient evidence); State v. Lawrence, 234 P.2d 600,
601 (Utah 1951) (noting in dicta that "[t]he State's attorney might properly and with little
difficulty have moved to reopen and supply the missing evidence").
The decision to allow the prosecution to reopen its case after resting is committed
to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Daday v. R. D. Logging Co., Inc., 2003 UT
App 125U (civil case); United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 740-41 (6th Cir.
1985) (criminal case). A trial court abuses its discretion only "if the trial court's actions
are inherently unfair or if... no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the
trial court." Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, \ 101 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
"Ordinarily, the trial court is vested with wide discretion to permit the reopening
of either party's case." United States v. Hinderman, 625 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1980).
Matters relevant to the exercise of that discretion may include, but are not limited to, the
prosecution's "explanation for fail[ing] to present the evidence in its case-in-chief," "the
timeliness of the motion, the character of the testimony, and the effect of granting the
motion." Blankenship, 775 F.2d at 741. "The most important consideration is whether
the opposing party is prejudiced by reopening." Id. But "prejudice means more than the
denial of an unearned windfall; it requires unfairness." United States v. Keyes, 214 Fed.
Appx. 145, 153 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (addressing trial court's decision to permit
prosecution to reopen soon after the prosecution had rested, before the defense had
15

presented any evidence, and before the case had been submitted to the jury) (attached in
Addendum B).
Here, the trial court properly exercised its discretion. Its decision to allow the
State to reopen was not inherently unfair, nor was it a decision that no reasonable person
would have taken. Moreover, many factors supported the decision. First, a reasonable
explanation existed for the State's failing to present the evidence in its case in chief. As
explained above, evidence of venue is unnecessary. Further, even assuming it was
necessary, the prosecution's failure to elicit testimony that Saddler Drive was in West
Jordan City and that West Jordan City was in Salt Lake County was, as the trial court
found, inadvertent. See Rl29:72. "Reopening is often permitted to supply some
technical requirement such as the location of a crime—needed to establish venue—or to
supply some detail overlooked by inadvertence." Blankenship, 775 F.2d at 740; see
Keyes, 214 Fed. Appx. at 153 (proper to permit reopening to supply testimony
inadvertently omitted).
Finally, defendant suffered no prejudice. The trial court permitted the State to
reopen immediately after it had rested and the omission was noted. Defendant had
presented no testimony at this point. Thus, "[t]he belated receipt of [the] testimony [did]
not imbue the evidence with distorted importance, prejudice the opposing party's case, or
preclude an adversary from having an adequate opportunity to meet the additional
testimony offered." Blankenship, 775 F.2d at 741. "Where, as in this case, reopening is
permitted after the [prosecution] has rested its case in chief, but before the defendant has
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presented any evidence, it is unlikely that prejudice sufficient to establish an abuse of
discretion can be established." Id.
Defendant claims that the State's failure to present evidence of venue was
intentional, not inadvertent. He claims that "the record shows that the State's failure to
present direct evidence of venue was the result of a conscious decision, not [an]
oversight." Appellant's Br. at 9. Defendant asserts that the trial court clearly erred when
it found that the State's failure to elicit evidence that the offense occurred in Salt Lake
County was inadvertent. See id. at 10. Defendant bases this claim on the fact that "[t]he
State did not ask to reopen its case to present additional evidence regarding venue" and
that the "prosecutor list[ed] its evidence related to venue and ask[ed] the trial court to
take judicial notice that the Saddler Drive address was in Salt Lake County based on the
evidence." Id. at 10. Defendant claims that "[t]he logical conclusion from this
evidence . . . is that the State consciously decided to rely on the circumstantial evidence
presented by Officer Eatchell, rather than eliciting direct evidence of venue." Id.
Thus, defendant claims that because the State argued that its evidence was
sufficient to establish venue and/or that the trial court could cure any insufficiency by
taking judicial notice, the State intentionally left out evidence that the location of the
address was in Salt Lake County. What defendant's evidence shows is that the
prosecutor, making the best arguments he could, attempted to convince the trial court to
deny the motion to dismiss. It fails to show that before resting the prosecutor
intentionally chose not to present evidence that the offense occurred in Salt Lake County.
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Defendant also claims that he suffered prejudice because he was convicted:
"[A]bsent the additional evidence presented after the court improperly allowed the State
to reopen its case, there was insufficient evidence to establish venue by a preponderance
of the evidence." Appellant's Br. at 11. Defendant does not demonstrate or even claim
that the trial court's decision to allow the State to reopen prejudiced his ability to present
his defense. See id. at 6-13. He claims only the loss of an unearned windfall. "[T]he
denial of an unearned windfall" does not constitute prejudice. Keyes, 214 Fed. Appx. at
153. Thus, even assuming that the trial court erred in allowing the State to reopen, any
error was not prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's claim fails for multiple reasons. Venue is not an element of the
offense and need not be proved to the jury. Defendant did not object to venue before trial
and thus waived any objection to venue. In any case, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it permitted the State to reopen its case in chief to present evidence that
the offense occurred in Salt Lake County.
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed..
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76-1-202, Venue of actions.
(1) Criminal actions shall be tried in the county, district, or precinct where the offense is alleged to have been
nmitted. In determining the proper place of trial, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) If the commission of an offense commenced outside the state is consummated within this state, the
ender shall be tried in the county where the offense is consummated.
(b) When conduct constituting elements of an offense or results that constitute elements, whether the conduct
result constituting elements is in itself unlawful, shall occur in two or more counties, trial of the offense may
held in any of the counties concerned.
(c) If a person committing an offense upon the person of another is located in one county and his victim is
ated in another county at the time of the commission of the offense, trial may be held in either county.
(d) If a cause of death is inflicted in one county and death ensues in another county, the offender may be
^d in either county.
(e) A person who commits an inchoate offense may be tried in any county in which any act that is an element
the offense, including the agreement in conspiracy, is committed.
(f) Where a person in one county solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid another in the planning or
mmission of an offense in another county, he may be tried for the offense in either county.
(g) When an offense is committed within this state and it cannot be readily determined in which county or
rtrict the offense occurred, the following provisions shall be applicable:
(i) When an offense is committed upon any railroad car, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft passing within this
ite, the offender may be tried in any county through which such railroad car, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft
s passed.
(ii) When an offense is committed on any body of water bordering on or within this state, the offender may
tried in any county adjacent to such body of water. The words "body of water" shall include but not be
mited to any stream, river, lake, or reservoir, whether natural or man-made.
(iii) A person who commits theft may be tried in any county in which he exerts control over the property
fected.
(iv) If an offense is committed on or near the boundary of two or more counties, trial of the offense may be
Id in any of such counties.
(v) For any other offense, trial may be held in the county in which the defendant resides, or, if he has no
ted residence, in the county in which he is apprehended or to which he is extradited.
(h) A person who commits an offense based on Chapter 6, Part 11, Identity Fraud Act, may be tried in the
>unty:
(i) where the victim's personal identifying information was obtained;
(ii) where the defendant used or attempted to use the personally identifying information;
(iii) where the victim of the identity fraud resides or is found; or
(iv) if multiple offenses of identity fraud occur in multiple jurisdictions, in any county where the victim's
entity was used or obtained, or where the victim resides or is found.
(2) All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a defendant unless made before trial.
mended by Chapter 227, 2004 General Session
ownload Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_01011.ZIP 3,144 Bytes
ections in this Chapter [Chapters in this Title) All TitleslLegislative Home Page
ist revised. Thursday, July 19, 2007

76-1-501. Presumption of innocence - "Element of the offense" defined.
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element of the offense
irged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be
pitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the
finition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense but shall be established by a
sponderance of the evidence.
.acted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session
>wnload Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_01025.ZIP 1,952 Bytes
ctions in this Chapter [Chapters in this Title|All TitleslLegislative Home Page
t revised: Thursday, July 19, 2007

Addendum B

Addendum B

Westiaw.
214Fed.Appx. 145

Page 1

214 Fed.Appx. 145, 2007 WL 108295 (C.A.3 (Pa.))
(Cite as: 214 Fed.Appx. 145)

H
U.S. v. Keyes
C.A.3 (Pa.),2007.
This case was not selected for publication in the
Federal Reporter.Not for Publication in West's
Federal Reporter See Fed. Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 generally governing citation of
judicial decisions issued on or after Jan. 1, 2007.
See also Third Circuit LAR, App. I, IOP 5.7. (Find
CTA3 App. I, IOP 5.7)
United States Court of Appeals,Third Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America
v.
Andre KEYES, Appellant in No. 05-1684,
Fernando Pena, Appellant in No. 05-1859,
Calvin Goodrich, Appellant in No. 05-1920,
andAngel Castillo-Bienvenido, Jr., Appellant in No.
05-1938.
Nos. 05-1684, 05-1859, 05-1920, & 05-1938.
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March
10,2006.
Filed Jan, 17,2007.
Background: Defendants were convicted in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, John R. Padova, J., of conspiracy
to sell crack cocaine. Defendants appealed.
Holdings: In a consolidated appeal, the Court of
Appeals, Rodriguez, District Judge, sitting by
designation, held that:
(1) evidence was sufficient to support finding that
defendants were involved in a single conspiracy to
sell drugs;
(2) allowing the government to reopen its case to
enter lab report into evidence indicating that seized
drugs were crack was not prejudicial;
(3) sentence of 260 months incarceration was
reasonable;

(4) testimony of government's expert witness, an
intelligence analyst, regarding cell phone calls
among the alleged co-conspirators was not
inadmissible hearsay; and
(5) even if testimony of government's expert witness
was improperly admitted, the error was harmless.

Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Conspiracy 91 €=>47(12)
91 Conspiracy
9III Criminal Responsibility
9111(B) Prosecution
9 lk44 Evidence
91k47 Weight and Sufficiency
91k47(3) Particular Conspiracies
91k47(12) k. Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs. Most Cited Cases
Evidence was sufficient to support finding that
defendants were involved in a single conspiracy to
sell drugs, rather than multiple conspiracies, as
required to sustain defendants' convictions for
conspiring to sell cocaine; the evidence showed that
the essential feature of the conspiracy was that its
members cooperatively maintained control of the
drug trafficking in a specific area and dictated who
was permitted to sell in that area. Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, §§
401(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 406, 21 U.S.C.A. §§
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846.
[2] Criminal Law 110 €=^686(2)
110 Criminal Law
110XX Trial
IIOXX(C) Reception of Evidence
110k685 Reopening Case for Further
Evidence
110k686 In General
110k686(2) k. After Party Offering
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Evidence Has Rested. Most Cited Cases
In criminal proceedings for conspiring to sell crack
cocaine, allowing the government to reopen its case
to enter lab report into evidence indicating that
seized drugs were crack, was not prejudicial to
defendant; the motion to reopen was made in a
timely fashion, the defense had not yet presented
any evidence, and the case had not been submitted
to the jury. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970, §§ 401(a)(1), (b)(1)(B),
406, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846.
[3] Conspiracy 91 €^>51
91 Conspiracy
9III Criminal Responsibility
9111(C) Sentence and Punishment
91k51 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Sentence of 260 months incarceration for
conviction of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base
of 50 grams, based on court's finding, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that defendant, was
responsible for the distribution of 1.5 kilograms of
crack cocaine, was a leader/supervisor of the
organization, and had possessed a firearm in
connection with the offense was reasonable;
sentence was within the range allowed by statute,
which imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of
10 years imprisonment and a maximum term of life
imprisonment, and was below sentencing guidelines
range of 360 months to life. Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, §§
401(b)(1)(A), 406, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(b)(1)(A),
846.
[4] Criminal Law 110 €==>476.6
110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
110XVII(R) Opinion Evidence
110k468 Subjects of Expert Testimony
110k476.6 k. Miscellaneous Matters.
Most Cited Cases
In drug conspiracy prosecution, testimony of
government's expert witness, an intelligence analyst,
regarding cell phone calls among the alleged
co-conspirators was admissible; such evidence was
already in the record and expert's testimony could
be viewed as summary testimony of evidence

properly received. Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, §§ 401(a)(1),
(b)(1)(B), 406, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B),
846.
[5] Criminal Law 110 €==>1169.9
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
1 lOkl 169 Admission of Evidence
HOkl 169.9 k. Opinion Evidence. Most
Cited Cases
In drug conspiracy prosecution, even if testimony of
government's expert witness, an intelligence analyst,
regarding cell phone calls among the alleged
co-conspirators was improperly admitted, the error
was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of
defendants' guilt; the record was replete with
testimony implicating the defendants in the
conspiracy.
Comprehensive
Drug
Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, §§ 401(a)(1),
(b)(1)(B), 406, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B),
846.
[6] Criminal Law 110 €=>H73.2(9)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
1 lOkl 173 Failure or Refusal to Give
Instructions
HOkl 173.2 Instructions on Particular
Points
HOkl 173.2(9) k. Purpose and
Effect of Evidence; Excluding Evidence from
Consideration. Most Cited Cases
District court's failure to give a limiting instruction
about testimony concerning defendant's use of and
struggle with a gun was harmless error in drug
conspiracy prosecution; testimony was properly
admitted that defendant and a co-defendant
pistol-whipped an individual for selling drugs
without permission in the vicinity of the
conspiracy's drug locations. Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, §§
401(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 406, 21 U.S.C.A. §§
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846; Fed.Rules EvidRuIe
404(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
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*147 On Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
(Nos.03-cr-487-03, -09, -11, -01), The Honorable
John R. Padova, District Judge.
Francis C. Barbieri, Jr., Office of United States
Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, for United States of
America.
Marc S. Fisher, Worth, Magee & Fisher, Allentown,
PA, for Andre Keyes.
Paul M. George, McKinney
& George,
Philadelphia, PA, for Fernando Pena.
Mark S. Refowich, Easton, PA, for Calvin Goodrich.
David L. McColgin, Elaine Demasse, Defender
Association of Philadelphia Federal Court Division,
Philadelphia, PA, for Angel Castillo-Bienvenido, Jr.
Before ALDISERT and ROTH,™* Senior Circuit
Judges, RODRIGUEZ, FN**District Judge.
FN* The Honorable Jane R. Roth assumed
senior status on May 31, 2006.
FN** The Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez
, Senior United States District Judge for
the District of New Jersey, sitting by
designation.

RODRIGUEZ, District Judge.
**1 In consolidated appeals, Appellants, Andre
Keyes, Fernando Pena, Calvin Goodrich, and Angel
Castillo-Bienvenido, Jr., appeal their convictions
and sentences entered in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania after they were found guilty of
conspiracy to sell crack cocaine in Reading,
Pennsylvania from January 2002 through October
2003.
Keyes based his appeal on the argument that the
Government did not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was part of a single conspiracy to
distribute drugs; instead, he argues, the evidence
showed there were distinct and multiple
conspiracies at work. He also argues that the
district court improperly allowed the Government to
reopen its case and introduce a new document never
shared with defense counsel until after the

Government failed to introduce evidence sufficient
to sustain three charges against Keyes.
Pena has argued that the evidence at trial showed he
was a competitor, rather than a member of the drug
dealing conspiracy charged in this case. He also
asserts that the sentencing court should not have
permitted the Government to call new witnesses at
his sentencing in order to enhance his guideline
calculation with facts that had not been proven to a
jury; Pena *148 was sentenced to 260 months of
incarceration.
Goodrich seeks review of one issue: whether the
district court abused its discretion in admitting into
evidence testimony regarding cell phone records,
the identities of the recipients of cell phone calls,
and the identities of cell phone number owners.
Goodrich argues that such evidence was hearsay.
Similarly, Castillo-Bienvenido argues that the
district court erred in failing to exclude as hearsay
the testimony of, and written charts and graphs
created by, law enforcement officers regarding cell
phone records because no custodian of the records
or other qualified witness authenticated the records
or explained how they were compiled and kept.
Castillo-Bienvenido also contends that he was
unfairly prejudiced by the admission of testimony
that he held a loaded gun to a man's back on a
public street and wrestled with the man for control
of the gun, when he was not charged with a firearms
offense and the incident was not shown to be related
to the charges against him.

Because we write solely for the parties, we will only
mention those facts relevant to our analysis. On
October 28, 2003, a Grand Jury in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania returned a Superseding
Indictment against Defendant-Appellants Andre
Keyes, Fernando Pena, Calvin Goodrich, Angel
Castillo-Bienvenido, and nine co-defendants.
Keyes, Pena, Goodrich, and Castillo-Bienvenido
were charged with conspiracy to distribute in excess
of fifty grams of cocaine base in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (Count One); Keyes, Goodrich, and
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Castillo-Bienvenido were charged with possession
with intent to distribute in excess of five grams of
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Ten and
Count Nineteen) and possession with intent to
distribute in excess of five grams of cocaine base
within 1,000 feet of a school in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 860(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Eleven
and Count Twenty). In addition, Keyes was
charged with possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 and employing a
juvenile to distribute crack in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 861(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. On or about
February 18, 2004, following a six-day jury trial,
Keyes, Pena, Goodrich, and Castillo-Bienvenido
were convicted of all charged counts.

**2 This Court has jurisdiction to review the final
judgments of the district court under 28 U.S.C. §
1291; we also have jurisdiction over these appeals
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742.

Single versus Multiple Conspiracies
The issue of whether a single conspiracy or multiple
conspiracies exists is a fact question to be decided
by a jury. United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560,
572 (3d Cir.1994). Keyes has argued that the
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of a
single conspiracy to distribute drugs. Specifically,
Keyes contends that many of the alleged drug
houses run by the "Tenth Street Gang" were
actually independently operated and kept so under
threat of violence. To support this contention,
Keyes points to the testimony of Miguel
Acevedo-Hernandez,
Andrew Anthony Cruz,
Jessica Almodovar, and Kenneth *149 Willams. In
addition, Keyes has argued that there were multiple
conspiracies because "different people were caught
at different places doing their own different

operations."
Similarly, Pena has argued that the evidence failed
to demonstrate that he was a member of the charged
conspiracy. Instead, he contends, he was a
competitor. He has appealed the denial of his
motion for acquittal, but acknowledges that a
reviewing court will overturn a jury verdict only
when the record contains no evidence, regardless of
how it is weighted, from which a jury could find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.
Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 218-19 (3d Cir.1999).
The standard of review for sufficiency of the
evidence claims is a deferential standard. United
States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir.1998)
(citing United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080
(3d Cir.1996)). This inquiry does not require a
court to ask itself whether it believes that the
evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
Instead, the relevant question is whether after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
The essence of a conspiracy is an agreement.
United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258-59 (3d
Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Nolan, 718 F.2d
589, 595 (3d Cir.1983)). The government need
only prove that the defendant agreed with at least
one of the persons named in the indictment that they
or one of them would perform an unlawful act. Id.
at 259. The essential elements of conspiracy are 1)
whether there was a common goal among the
conspirators,
2)
whether
the
agreement
contemplated bringing to pass a continuous result
that would not continue without the continuous
cooperation of the co-conspirators, and 3) the extent
to which the participants overlap in the various
dealings. Kelly, 892 F.2d at 259; but see United
States v. Padilla, 982 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir.1992) (
"we note that the Kelly factors are most useful to
show the existence of a single conspiracy, but that
the absence of one factor does not necessarily
defeat an inference of the existence of a single
conspiracy").
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**3 In Kelly, the defendant was convicted of
conspiracy to import and distribute P2P and to
manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. Id. at
256-57. The defendant argued on appeal that he
was unfairly prejudiced by a variance between the
single conspiracy charged in the indictment and
evidence at trial, which he claimed proved several
conspiracies. Id. at 258. This Court affirmed the
conviction and reasoned that 1) the common goal
was to make money from selling drugs, 2) the
success of one group was necessary for the success
of another group because the nature of the scheme
required cooperation to provide a steady supply of
P2P, and 3) the government need not prove that
each defendant knew all the details, goals, or other
participants in order to find a single conspiracy. Id.
Although multiple conspiracies are "separate
networks operating independently of each other,"
the relatedness of the activities of the
co-conspirators in support of the overall illegal
scheme can defeat a claim of multiple conspiracies.
United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 346 (3d
Cir.2002) (citing United States v. Barr, 963 F.2d
641, 648 (3d Cir.1992)). In Perez, the defendant
was convicted of conspiring to distribute and to
possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine.
Id. at 326. The defendant contended that the
conviction should be overturned because there was
*150 not specific knowledge of an interdependency
among the various factions. Id. at 347. This Court
disagreed and affirmed the conviction. We
reasoned that a party did not have to know all the
details and goals of all the participants to constitute
a single conspiracy, the party only had to be aware
that he or she was a part of a larger drug operation.
Id
Further, disputes between participants do not
necessarily fracture a single conspiracy. Kelly, 892
F.2d at 260 (citing United States v. DeVarona, 872
F.2d 114, 120 (5th Cir.1989)). In Kelly, the
common catalyst of the disputes between
defendants was greed; no party wanted to be left
out of the operation. Id. Therefore, the court
reasoned that there were not multiple conspiracies
operating against one another solely because there
were disputes between the defendants. Id.

Finally, this Court has recognized, "even an
occasional supplier (and by implication an
occasional buyer for redistribution) can be shown to
be a member of the conspiracy by evidence, direct
or inferential, of knowledge that she or he was part
of a larger operation." United States v. Price, 13
F.3d711,728(3dCir.l994).
The government's theory in this case was that the
members of the Tenth Street Gang conspired to
maintain control over their area with guns,
threatening and using violence, and wearing
bullet-proof vests. The evidence showed that
Miguel Acevedo-Hernandez and Manuel Perez
controlled the drug trafficking in the area of 10th
and Franklin Streets and dictated who was
permitted to sell in that area.
**4 [1] We find that a trier of fact could have
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Keyes
was a part of a single conspiracy because he was a
seller for the drug network of distributor
Acevedo-Hernandez. For example, Andrew Cruz
testified that in approximately November 2002, he
began
delivering
crack
for
Miguel
Acevedo-Hernandez in the vicinity of 10th and
Frankin Streets. Keyes App. IV 934-38. He
further testified that he delivered crack from Miguel
Acevedo-Hernandez to Keyes at 280 South 9th
Street on two separate occasions. Keyes App. IV
936-37. Miguel Acevedo-Hernandez admitted
supplying Cruz with drugs which Cruz distributed
to sellers in the area, including Keyes. Keyes App.
V 1040-42. He also stated that the drug business
was limited to certain approved dealers and that if
someone else tried to sell in the neighborhood, "
they would have problems." Keyes App. V 1053.
Among the people permitted to sell in the area were
Keyes,
Goodrich,
Mustafa
Sheriff,
and
Castillo-Bienviedo. Keyes App. V 1055.
In addition, on two occasions, Reading police
discovered Keyes wearing a bulletproof vest in
houses where drug deals occurred. Officer Edwin
Santiago testified that on February 18, 2003, he
found Keyes sitting next to a firearm at 280 South
9th Street, where police discovered crack cocaine.
Keyes App. I 101-07. Officer Jose Colon
confirmed Officer Santiago's testimony, and
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reported that Keyes was wearing a bulletproof vest
at the time of the search. Keyes App. I 130-31.
Officer Edward Heim testified that on April 29,
2003, he and other officers served a search warrant
at the first floor apartment of 37 South 9th Street.
Inside the apartment the officers found Keyes,
Goodrich, Wiifredo Ortiz, Lydia Carrera-Aponte,
and a juvenile. Keyes App. II 385. The police
recovered 73 packets of crack cocaine, three
bulletproof vests, and $340 from the room. Once
again, Keyes was wearing a bulletproof vest.
Keyes App. II 390.
Keyes's and Pefia's relationships with other sellers
were corroborated by cell phone records. Tiffany
Stambaugh, an intelligence* 151 analyst with the
Reading Area Violent Crimes Task Force ("
RAVCTF"), testified with regard to the telephone
records of co-defendants Mustafa Sheriff, Calvin
Goodrich, and Andrew Cruz. These records showed
that Sheriff placed 856 calls to Keyes during the
three-month period from February 1, 2003 to April
30, 2003. Keyes App. V 1170. During the same
period, Sheriff made 556 calls to Cruz, 234 calls to
Castillo-Bienvenido, 217 calls to Pena, 190 calls to
Acevedo-Hernandez, and 165 calls to Goodrich.
Keyes App. V 1170-71.
In spite of the argument that multiple conspiracies
existed because "different people were caught at
different places," Keyes was found at 280 South 9th
Street, 37 South 9th Street, and 22 Orange Street
during Reading police raids. In light of the
testimony presented, we find that a trier of fact
could have concluded that the 10th and Franklin
Street gangs benefitted from exclusively selling
drugs in the 10th Street area and were therefore
committed to a single, common objective. A
reasonable jury could infer that the constant
communication, in just a three-month period, was
representative of individuals with a common
objective.
**5 Further, a trier of fact could have concluded
that Keyes and Pena and their codefendants had an
overlap in participation. Officer Gesh introduced a
videotape of a surveillance he conducted on March
31, 2003 at 50th South 10th Street and identified
Keyes, Goodrich, Castillo-Bienvenido, Sheriff, and

Kenneth Williams standing together at that location.
Keyes App. I 184. Kenneth Williams admitted he
was arrested on April 16, 2003, in possession of 9.6
grams of crack cocaine and a .45 caliber handgun.
He testified that drugs could be sold in the South
10th Street location only if they came from one of
the defendants. Keyes App. II 331. He identified
the sellers at this location as Pena, Goodrich,
Castillo, Ortiz, and himself. Pena J.A. 259. Ortiz
sold at that location for Pena. Pena J.A. 264.
Williams sold for Sheriff and Cruz. Pena J.A.
261-63. He described how the sellers cooperated
by taking turns making sales or pooling their drugs
to fill larger orders. Pena J.A. 361. He also
testified
that
he
observed
Keyes,
Castillo-Bienvenido, Goodrich, and Pena working
together packaging drugs at 37 South 9th Street.
Keyes App. II284-87, 320-21.
Jessica Almodovar, a juvenile, testified that Keyes,
Goodrich, Sheriff, Pena, and Castillo-Bienvenido
sold drugs from 22 Orange Street and stated that
Keyes, Sheriff, and Castillo-Bienvenido had given
her drugs to sell. Keyes App. Ill 642-47. Jasmine
Lawson admitted selling drugs in the area of 10th
and Franklin Streets in the summer of 2002 and
identified
Keyes, Goodrich,
Sheriff,
Pena,
Castillo-Bienvenido, and Acevedo-Hernandez as
individuals involved in the drug trafficking in the
area during the summer of 2002. Keyes App. IV
744, 754-61. Lawson also testified to seeing
Castillo-Bienvenido and Sheriff "pistol-whip"
another person who was attempting to sell drugs in
the 10th Street area without permission. Keyes
App. IV 761-64. Only sellers working for a
member of the conspiracy were permitted to sell
drugs at 10th and Franklin Streets. Keyes App. IV
767.
Lydia Carrera-Aponte testified that Goodrich,
Sheriff, and Castillo-Bienvenido sold crack cocaine
in front of her residence at 37 South 10th Street in
June 2002. Keyes App. IV 829-32. In March
2003, she lived at 50 South 10th Street and again
observed
Goodrich,
Sheriff,
Pena,
and
Castillo-Bienvenido selling crack cocaine in her
apartment building. Keyes App. IV 834-35.
Later, while living at 37 South 9th Street, she
observed Keyes, Goodrich, *152 Sheriff, Ortiz, and
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Castillo-Bienvenido selling crack cocaine in that
apartment building. Keyes App. IV 840-42.
While "hanging out" at 22 Orange Street,
Carrera-Aponte observed Keyes, Goodrich, Sheriff,
and Castillo-Bienvenido selling crack cocaine.
Keyes App. IV 847-49.
A trier of fact could have concluded that Keyes and
Pena and the other defendants had an overlap in
participation in the charged conspiracy. The
evidence showed that the essential feature of this
conspiracy was that its members cooperatively
maintained control of the drug trafficking in the
area of 10th and Franklin Streets, and dictated who
was permitted to sell in that area. A reasonable
jury could have found that Keyes and Pena
participated in and took advantage of this
arrangement, and thus joined the conspiracy.
**6 In so deciding, the jury in this case rejected the
notion that squabbles among the organization's
members, subdivided into separate territories,
rendered them "competitors," taking them outside
the conspiracy. This Court has stated that:
If it is shown that an organized gang controls drug
distribution in the defendant's neighborhood and
that the gang has divided the neighborhood into
zones in which only a single dealer may operate,
then the fact that the defendant consistently sells his
or her drugs only within certain geographical
parameters would provide evidence that the
defendant both knew of the existence of the
conspiracy and was a participant in it.

United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 151 (3d
Cir.2001). Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, as we must, we find a
reasonable jury could have concluded beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Appellants were supplied
with drugs for distribution by Perez and
Acevedo-Heraandez and knew of, and intended to
benefit from, the mutual control of the area.
Accordingly, the conspiracy convictions will be
sustained.

Reopening of Government's Case against Keyes

Keyes argues that the district court improperly
allowed the government to reopen its case. At the
conclusion of the government's case-in-chief,
defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal as
to Counts 2, 3, and 4 because the government failed
to introduce evidence that the drugs seized on
February 18, 2003 were crack. Keyes contends
that introducing this evidence prejudiced him
because without it the district court would have
sustained his motion for judgment of acquittal as to
Counts 2, 3, and 4. He further contends that he was
prejudiced because the lab report entered into
evidence after reopening was never previously
shared with the defense counsel. In addition,
Keyes argues that the government did not provide
the district court with an explanation for its failure
to provide the required evidence.
[2] The government contends that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
prosecution to reopen its case. On the last day of
the government's case-in-chief, the prosecution
presented the testimony of several chemists
employed by the Pennsylvania State Police Bureau
of Forensic Services who had prepared lab reports
on the drug evidence entered at trial. Chemist Erin
Luck prepared two lab reports, but was mistakenly
only asked about one report during the
government's
case-in-chief.
The
government
contends that its explanation of "inadvertent mistake
" was sufficient. The government further contends
that Keyes was not prejudiced because defense
counsel had an opportunity to rebut this additional
evidence.
The district court's decision on a motion to reopen
is reviewed for abuse of discretion.* 153 Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S.
321, 331, 91 S.Ct. 795, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971).
When deciding whether to permit reopening, the
court's focus is on whether the party opposing the
reopening would be prejudiced if reopening is
permitted. United States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213,
220 (3d Cir.2000). A critical factor in evaluating
prejudice is the timing of the motion to reopen.
United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 181 (3d
Cir.2002). In Coward, this Court reasoned that
**7 If [the motion to reopen] comes at a stage in the
proceedings where the opposing party will have an
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opportunity to respond and attempt to rebut the
evidence introduced after reopening, it is not nearly
as likely to be prejudicial as when reopening is
granted after all parties have rested, or even after
the case has been submitted to the jury.
Id. at 181. In exercising its discretion, the court
must also consider the character of the testimony
and the effect of the granting of the motion. Id.
The evidence proffered should be relevant,
admissible, technically adequate, and helpful to the
jury in ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Id.
Further, "[t]he party moving to reopen should
provide a reasonable explanation for failure to
present the evidence [initially]." Kithcart, 218 F.3d
at 220; see also United States v. Blankenship, 775
F.2d 735, 740 (6th Cir.1985) ("reopening is often
permitted to supply some technical requirement
such as the location of a crime-needed to establish
venue-or to supply some detail overlooked by
inadvertence"). In Kithcart, we reasoned that in
order to properly exercise its discretion, the district
court must evaluate the offered explanation and
determine if it is both reasonable and adequate to
explain why the government initially failed to
introduce evidence that may have been essential to
meeting its burden of proof. Id.
Here, the district court had the discretion to rule
that the reopening would not prejudice Keyes
because the motion to reopen was made in a timely
fashion. The Government made its motion to
reopen soon after resting its case-in-chief, the
defense had not yet presented any evidence, and the
case had not been submitted to the jury yet. Keyes
App. V 1208. Therefore, the timing of the motion
did not prejudice Keyes because there was an
opportunity to respond and rebut the evidence
during the defense case.

only claim of unfairness is based on the
prosecution's failure to turn over a copy of the lab
report on a timely basis, not that the timing of the
production impaired or prejudiced his defense.
Keyes App. V 1207-08. Indeed, the defense did
not ask questions regarding the conclusions reached
by the chemists' testimony. Keyes App. IV
1226-27.
In addition, the prosecution provided a reasonable
and adequate explanation when it admitted
inadvertence:
Yes, Your Honor, the Pennsylvania State Police
routinely describe cocaine base or powder as just
cocaine. Sometimes it is necessary in a federal
case to go back and ask them to do a supplemental
report that distinguishes between cocaine and
cocaine base. That was done in this case. I did
not receive a copy of that revised program until I
had gone to Reading on Friday of last week. I have
not provided a copy to counsel, and it was through
inadvertence.*154 The only difference, though,
between this document and the one they had before
is instead of calling it [cocaine, it is called cocaine
base.]

**8 Keyes App. V 1207-08. The district court
accepted this as an adequate explanation of the
prosecution's failure to introduce the evidence
during its case-in-chief, stating, "All right. They
can reopen. It's a minor matter, it won't take that
long. Everybody makes mistakes. We had a
mistake on the verdict sheet." Keyes App. V 1208.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when
it determined that the prosecution could reopen its
case because the defense was not prejudiced and the
prosecution's explanation of its failure to introduce
evidence was reasonable and adequate.

Pena's Sentence
Despite Keyes's argument that permitting the
Government to reopen its case was prejudicial
because without the omitted testimony he would
have been acquitted on three counts of the
indictment, prejudice means more than the denial of
an unearned windfall; it requires unfairness. The

Pena has objected to the sentence imposed, arguing
that the sentencing court erred in considering
factors not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt-that he assumed a leadership role, his use of a
weapon, and his prior criminal record.

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

214Fed.Appx. 145
214 FeAAppx. 145, 2007 WL 108295 (C.A.3 (Pa.))
(Cite as: 214 Fed.Appx. 145)
Pena was convicted before but sentenced after the
Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 244, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621
(2005), holding that a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury is violated when his or her
sentence is increased beyond the statutory
maximum based on the sentencing judge's findings
of fact beyond facts established by a plea of guilty,
a jury verdict proved beyond a reasonable doubt, or
those admitted by the defendant under a mandatory
application of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines. As we have explained, in light of that
holding and the "remedial" opinion which rendered
the Guidelines "effectively advisory," id. at 245,
125 S.Ct. 738,udistrict courts may fact-find to
increase sentences beyond the Guidelines range
provided they are within the statutory minimum and
maximum dictated by the United States Code, take
into account the relevant sentencing factors set out
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and ultimately are '
reasonable.' " United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d
237, 240-43 (3d Cir.2006) (citing Booker, 543 U.S.
at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738). Moreover, we have held
that the ex post facto principles are not violated
when the defendant has fair warning that the crime
he committed is punishable up to the statutory
maximum of the crime. United States v.
Pennavaria, 445 F.3d 720, 723 (3d Cir.2006). A
defendant has fair warning that his sentence could
be enhanced on judge-found facts as long as the
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum.
Id. at 723-24. Thus, a defendant may be sentenced
up to the statutory maximum of the crime
committed without violating the defendant's due
process rights. Id.
[3] We have reviewed the record in this case to
determine whether the district court erred in relying
upon judge-found facts to enhance Pena's sentence
beyond the statutory maximum for his crime. Pena
was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine
base of 50 grams under 21 U.S.C. § 846. Pena J.A.
1397. The maximum penalty under the statute is
life imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Pen
a was sentenced to 260 months in prison, below the
statutory maximum. Pena J.A. 1461.
**9 At the sentencing hearing held on March 14,
2005, over Pena's objection, the Government called

Mustafa Sheriff and Manuel Perez to testify to the
quantity of crack cocaine Pena distributed during
the course of the conspiracy, his role in the
conspiracy, and his possession of a gun. Pena J.A.
1426-52. Based on this testimony, the district
court found, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that he was *155 responsible for the distribution of
1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine, was a
leader/supervisor of the organization, and had
possessed a firearm in connection with the offense.
Pena J.A. 1454-57. Those findings, to which Pena
has presented no factual rebuttal, made his offense
level 42 and, with his criminal history of VI, his
guideline sentencing range was determined to be
360 months to life. After considering the advisory
Sentencing Guidelines and all relevant "3553(a)
factors," including the seriousness of the offense
and Pena's extensive criminal history, the court
sentenced Pena to 260 months incarceration and
five years supervised release. Pena J.A. 1457,
1459-61. This sentence was within the range
allowed by statute, which imposed a mandatory
minimum sentence of 10 years imprisonment and a
maximum term of life imprisonment™

FN1. The jury found that the conspiracy
involved more than 50 grams of cocaine,
and thus the statutory range was ten years
to life. See2\ U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846
We find the sentencing judge correctly applied the
Guidelines in an advisory capacity in Pena's case,
establishing that the applicable guideline range
under the Sentencing Guidelines would be 360
months to life. In sentencing Pena to 260 months
in prison, the judge explicitly acknowledged that the
Sentencing Guidelines were advisory. We find the
sentence imposed to be reasonable, and we
therefore affirm.

Cell Phone Records
[4] Goodrich argues that the testimony of the
Government's expert witness, an intelligence
analyst, regarding cell phone calls among the
alleged co-conspirators should have been excluded
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as hearsay. Counsel objected to testimony that
Goodrich possessed a particular cell phone number
because, when he was arrested, he was not in
possession of a cell phone. Although the expert
witness testified as to the names or initials or
nicknames contained in the internal phone books of
various cell phones seized, implicating Goodrich,
the phones themselves were not brought into court,
nor were the records from the cell phone companies
brought in as business records. Specifically, the
expert witness testified that she reached the
conclusion that a telephone number at issue
belonged to Goodrich through "various proffer
statements, and the number was listed under his
known moniker, CJ, in various cell phones."
Goodrich Supp.App. 1126. Goodrich argues that
the witness should not have been allowed to rely
solely upon information furnished to her by other
investigators, who relied upon what was found in
the cell phones seized from others. His objection is
that this testimony that a particular cell phone
number belonged to him was hearsay and also
deprived him of his right to confrontation.
Goodrich also argues that a chart listing calls
allegedly made in furtherance of the conspiracy and
a list of numbers from cell phones seized by the FBI
in this matter were not properly authenticated
because the witness did not have personal
knowledge that Goodrich possessed the phone
number attributed to him.
**10 The Government contends that its witness
attributed a cell phone number to Goodrich based
upon evidence previously admitted at the trial. For
example, Kenneth Williams identified Goodrich as "
CJ," referred to him by that nickname throughout
his testimony, and identified the telephone number
assigned to Goodrich. Goodrich Supp.App.
211-12, 219, 221, 235, 240, 245, 237-39. Five
other cooperating witnesses also
identified
Goodrich as "CJ." Goodrich Supp.App. 211-12,
470, 603, 722, 793, 1018. Police Officer Edward
Heim testified that he examined the cell phones
*156 seized during the investigation and he
prepared a report listing the numbers programmed
into the phones; the report was entered into
evidence without objection. Goodrich Supp.App.
1089-90, 1154-55. Finally, FBI Special Agent
Gregory Banis testified that he subpoenaed

telephone records for three cell phones and
provided the records to Government witness Tiffany
Stambaugh of the National Guard Counter Drug
Program. Goodrich Supp.App. 1103.
At trial, Stambaugh explained the analysis she
performed on the phone records to identify the
number of times each of the three phones called or
had been called by phones allegedly belonging to
other members of the conspiracy; she introduced
charts she had prepared to illustrate her data.
Goodrich App. 33-36; Goodrich Supp.App.
1122-24, 1127-39.
Castillo-Bienvenido has advanced the same
argument, and has added that the records received
by Banis and analyzed by Stambaugh were in the
form of a computer spreadsheet, rather than on
paper. Accordingly, Stambaugh's analysis was
based on a computer search through the records.
Castillo-Bienvenido objected to the admission of
testimony and exhibits regarding the phone records
because no authenticating evidence was presented
to establish how the wireless carrier compiled and
maintained the phone records.
The standard of review for admissibility of evidence
is abuse of discretion. United States v. Serafini,
233 F.3d 758, 768 (3d Cir.2000). The district
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
Stambaugh to describe a certain telephone number
as belonging to Goodrich. She explained that the
number was attributed to him due to proffer
statements and the fact that it was listed under his
known moniker, CJ, in various cell phones,
including that of Kenneth Williams. Goodrich
Supp.App. 1126-27. Such evidence was already in
the record; Stambaugh's testimony can be viewed
as summary testimony of evidence properly
received.
Regarding the argument that no foundation was
established to admit the phone company data as
business records, Castillo-Bienvenido contends that
Stambaugh's testimony failed to establish the
authenticity and reliability of the data she received.
The Government points out, however, that there
was no objection to Stambaugh's testimony
regarding her analysis of the phone records, which
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all
parties
accepted
at
trial.
Because
Castillo-Bienvenido's attorney never objected to the
business records foundation of the phone records
during Stambaugh's testimony, Appellant must
establish plain error to prevail. See United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770,
123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Although a proper
foundation should have been laid for the phone
records analyzed by Stambaugh, such an error did
not
affect
the
substantial
rights
of
Castillo-Bienvenido. See Johnson v. United States,
520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d
718 (1997) (to establish plain error, an appellant
must show that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings). The evidence provided regarding his
phone records, that is, the frequency of calls
between his number and three co-defendants, was of
minimal significance in light of the other
overwhelming evidence of Castillo-Bienvenido's
guilt.
**11 [5] Therefore, we accept the Government's
alternative argument that even if Stambaugh's
testimony was improperly admitted, the error was
harmless given the overwhelming evidence of
Goodrich's and Castillo-Bienvenido's guilt. The
record is replete with testimony implicating the
Appellants
in
the
conspiracy.
Though
corroborative of the witness testimony regarding the
co-defendants' association with each other, the
telephone records did not "make the case"; it was
obviously the *157 credibility of numerous
cooperating witnesses offered at trial that convicted
the Appellants.

Testimony regarding Castillo-Bienvenido and a
Firearm
Finally, Castillo-Bienvenido has argues that he was
unduly prejudiced by prior bad act testimony from a
cooperating witness to the effect that he held a
loaded gun to a man's back on a public street and
wrestled with the man for control of the gun.
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the
admission of other acts evidence for the purpose of
showing that an individual has a propensity or
disposition to act in a particular manner.
Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). The Court realizes that "the

Government has broad latitude to use 'other acts'
evidence to prove a conspiracy." United States v.
Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 324 (3d Cir.2002). To be
admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), "(1) the
evidence must have a proper purpose under Rule
404(b); (2) it must be relevant under Rule 402; (3)
its probative value must outweigh its potential for
unfair prejudicial effect under Rule 403; and (4)
the Court must charge the jury to consider the
evidence only for the limited purpose for which it is
admitted." United States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256,
261 (3d Cir.2002) (citing Huddleston v. United
States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99
L.Ed.2d 771 (1988)).
Castillo-Bienvenido was not charged with a
firearms offense and the incident was not shown to
be related to the charges against him. Therefore,
although represented to be probative of the
allegations in the conspiracy indictment, the
testimony should have been excluded, as it only
served to show a tendency to do bad acts. See
United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231 (3d Cir.1999).
Moreover, once the testimony was admitted, the
district court should have charged the jury to
consider the evidence only for the limited purposes
for which it was offered. It did not, although
during discussion of this issue at trial, the court
indicated that it would give a cautionary instruction.
Some errors are so unimportant and insignificant in
the setting of a particular case "that they may,
consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed
harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the
conviction." United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S.
499, 508, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983).
The Supreme Court has made it clear that a
reviewing court must consider the trial record as a
whole, ignoring errors that are harmless. Id. at
509, 103 S.Ct. 1974. The Court reasoned that "
given the myriad of safeguards provided to assure a
fair trial, and taking into account the reality of the
human fallibility of the participants, there can be no
such thing as an error-free, prefect trial, and that the
Constitution does not guarantee such a trial." Id. at
508-09, 103 S.Ct. 1974 (citing Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20
L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)).
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**12 [6] Considering the trial record as a whole, the
district court's failure to give a limiting instruction
concerning the testimony of Castillo-Bienvenido's
use of and struggle with a gun was harmless error.
As the Government noted, testimony was properly
admitted
that
Castillo-Bienvenido
and
a
co-defendant pistol-whipped an individual for
selling drugs without permission in the vicinity of
the conspiracy's drug locations. Castillo App. Ill,
859-60. We cannot say, therefore, that the
disputed testimony combined with the court's failure
to give a limiting instruction warrants reversal.

For the forgoing reasons, the judgments entered by
the district court is affirmed.
C.A.3 (Pa.),2007.
U.S. v. Keyes
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